| 64. QUOD HOC, LICET INEXPLICABILE SIT, TAMEN CREDENDUM SIT.
| 64. Although inexplicable, this [teaching] must be believed.
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| Videtur mihi huius tam sublimis rei secretum transcendere omnem so intellectus aciem humani, et idcirco conatum explicandi qualiter hoc sit /75/ continendum puto. Sufficere namque debere existimo rem incomprehensibilem indaganti, si ad hoc ratiocinando peruenerit ut eam certissime esse cognoscat, etiamsi penetrare nequeat intellectu quomodo ita sit; nec idcirco minus iis adhibendam fidei certitudinem, quae probationibus necessariis nulla alia repugnante ratione asseruntur, si suae naturalis altitudinis incomprehensibilitate explicari non patiantur.
| It seems to me that the mystery of so sublime a subject transcends all the vision of the human intellect. And for that reason I think it best to refrain from the attempt to explain how this thing is. For it is my opinion that one who is investigating an incomprehensible object ought to be satisfied if this reasoning shall have brought him far enough to recognise that this object most certainly exists; nor ought assured belief to be the less readily given to these truths which are declared to be such by cogent proofs, and without the contradiction of any other reason, if, because of the incomprehensibility of their own natural sublimity, they do not admit of explanation.
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| Quid autem tam incomprehensibile, tam ineffabile, quam id quod super omnia est? Quapropter si ea quae de summa essentia hactenus disputata sunt, necessariis sunt rationibus asserta: quamvis sic intellectu penetrari non possint, ut et verbis ualeant explicari, nullatenus tamen certitudinis eorum nutat soliditas. Nam si superior consideratio rationabiliter comprehendit incomprehensibile esse, quomodo eadem summa sapientia sciat ea quae fecit, de quibus tam multa nos scire necesse est: quis explicet quamodo sciat aut dicat seipsam, de qua aut nihil aut vix aliquid ab homine scire possibile est? Ergo si in eo quod seipsam dicit, generat pater et generatur filius: Generationem eius quis enarrabit?
| But what is so incomprehensible, so ineffable, as that which is above all things? Hence, if these truths, which have thus far been debated in connection with the supreme Being, have been declared on cogent grounds, even though they cannot be so examined by the human intellect as to be capable of explanation in words, their assured certainty is not therefore shaken. For, if a consideration, such as that above, rationally comprehends that it is incomprehensible in what way supreme Wisdom knows its creatures, of which we necessarily know so many; who shall explain how it knows and expresses itself, of which nothing or scarcely anything can be known by man? Hence, if it is not by virtue of the self-expression of this Wisdom that the Father begets and the Son is begotten, who shall tell his generation?
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| 65. QUOMODO DE INEFFABILI RE VERUM DISPUTATUM SIT.
| 65. How regarding [this] ineffable matter something true was argued.
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| Sed rursum si ita se ratio ineffabilitatis illius habet, immo quia sic est: quomodo stabit quidquid de illa secundum patris et filii et procedentis habitudinem disputatum est? Nam si vera illud ratione explicitum est: qualiter est illa ineffabilis? Aut si ineffabilis est: quomodo est ita, sicut est disputatum? An quodamtenus de illa potuit explicari, et ideo nihil prohibet esse verum quod disputatum est; sed quia penitus non /76/ potuit comprehendi: idcirco est ineffabilis?
| But again, if such is the character of its ineffability,—nay, since it is such,—how shall whatever conclusion our discussion has reached regarding it in terms of Father, Son, and emanating Spirit be valid? For, if it has been explained on true grounds, how is it ineffable? Or, if it is ineffable, how can it be such as our discussion has shown? Or, could it be explained to a certain extent, and therefore nothing would disprove the truth of our argument; but since it could not be comprehended at all, for that reason it would be ineffable?
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| Sed ad illud quid responderi poterit, quod iam supra in hac ipsa disputatione constitit: quia sic est summa essentia supra et extra omnem aliam naturam, ut si quando de illa dicitur aliquid verbis, quae communia sunt aliis naturis, sensus nullatenus sit communis?
| But how shall we meet the truth that has already been established in this very discussion, namely, that the supreme Being is so above and beyond every other nature that, whenever any statement is made concerning it in words which are also applicable to other natures, the sense of these words in this case is by no means that in which they are applied to other natures.
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| Quem enim sensum in omnibus iis verbis quae cogitavi intellexi, nisi communem et usitatum? Si ergo usitatus sensus verborum alienus est ab illa: quidquid ratiocinatus sum non pertinet ad illam. Quomodo igitur verum est inventum esse aliquid de summa essentia, si quod est inventum longe diversum est ab illa?
| For what sense have I conceived of, in all these words that I have thought of, except the common and familiar sense? If, then, the familiar sense of words is alien to that Being, whatever I have inferred to be attributable to it is not its property. How, then, has any truth concerning the supreme Being been discovered, if what has been discovered is so alien to that Being?
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| Quid ergo? An quodam modo inventum est aliquid de incomprehensibili re, et quodam modo nihil perspectum est de ea? Saepe namque multa dicimus, quae proprie sicut sunt non exprimimus sed per aliud significamus id quod proprie aut nolumus aut non possumus depromere; ut cum per aenigmata loquimur. Et saepe videmus aliquid non proprie, quemadmodum res ipsa est sed per aliquam similitudinem aut imaginem; ut cum uultum alicuius consideramus in speculo. Sic quippe unam eandemque rem dicimus et non dicimus, videmus et non videmus. Dicimus et videmus per aliud, non dicimus et non videmus per suam proprietatem.
| What is to be inferred? Or, has there in some sort been some truth discovered regarding this incomprehensible object, and in some sort has nothing been proved regarding it? For often we speak of things which we do not express with precision as they are; but by another expression we indicate what we are unwilling or unable to express with precision, as when we speak in riddles. And often we see a thing, not precisely as it is in itself, but through a likeness or image, as when we look upon a face in a mirror. And in this way, we often express and yet do not express, see and yet do not see, one and the same object; we express and see it through another; we do not express it, and do not see it by virtue of its own proper nature.
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| Hac itaque ratione nihil prohibet et verum esse quod disputatum est hactenus de su m ma natura, et ipsam tam en nihilominus ineffabilem persistere: si nequaquam illa putetur per essentiae suee proprietatem expressa, sed utcumque per aliud designata.
| On these grounds, then, it appears that there is nothing to disprove the truth of our discussion thus far concerning the supreme Nature, and yet this Nature itself remains not the less ineffable, if we believe that it has never been expressed according to the peculiar nature of its own being, but somehow described through another.
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| Nam quaecumque nomina de illa natura dici posse videntur: non tam mihi eam ostendunt per proprietatem, quam per aliquam innuunt similitudinem. Etenim cum earundem vocum significationes cogito, familiarius concipio mente quod in rebus factis conspicio, quam id quod omnem humanum intellectum transcendere intelligo. Nam valde minus aliquid, immo longe aliud in mente mea sua significatione; constituunt, quam sit illud ad quod intelligendum per hanc tenuem significationem mens ipsa mea conatur proficere.
| For whatever terms seem applicable to that Nature do not reveal it to me in its proper character, but rather intimate it through some likeness. For, when I think of the meanings of these terms, I more naturally conceive in my mind of what I see in created objects, than of what I conceive to transcend all human understanding. For it is something much less, nay, something far different, that their meaning suggests to my mind, than that the conception of which my mind itself attempts to achieve through this shadowy signification.
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| Nam nec nomen sapientiae mihi sufficit ostendere illud, per quod omnia facta sunt de nihilo et servantur a nihilo; nec nomen essentiae mihi valet exprimere illud, quod per singularem altitudinem longe est supra omnia et per naturalem proprietatem /77/ valde est extra omnia.
| For, neither is the term wisdom sufficient to reveal to me that Being, through which all things were created from nothing and are preserved from nothingness; nor is the term essence capable of expressing to me that Being which, through its unique elevation, is far above all things, and through its peculiar natural character greatly transcends all things.
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| Sic igitur illa natura et ineffabilis est, quia per verba sicuti est nullatenus valet intimari; et falsum non est, si quid de illa ratione docente per aliud velut in aenigmate potest aestimari.
| In this way, then, is that Nature ineffable, because it is incapable of description in words or by any other means; and, at the same time, an inference regarding it, which can be reached by the instruction of reason or in some other way, as it were in a riddle, is not therefore necessarily false.
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